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De- and Re-Institutionalizing 
Technology Assessment in 
Contemporary Knowledge-
Based Economies
A Side-by-Side Review of Flemish and 
Walloon Technology Assessment
by Pierre Delvenne, Nathan Charlier, Bene-
dikt Rosskamp and Michiel van Oudheus-
den, SPIRAL Research Centre, Belgium
This article illuminates the potential role 
of technology assessment (TA) in knowl-
edge-driven science, technology and inno-
vation (STI) regimes by providing a compar-
ative review of Flemish and Walloon TA. It 
draws critical attention to the ways in which 
TA actors and institutes in Flanders and Wal-
lonia position themselves, or are positioned, 
in relation to dominant innovation policies 
and large-scale political transformations, 
notably the convergence of STI around the 
knowledge-based economy (KBE) and the 
regionalization of STI policy in Belgium. The 
article’s findings shed light on the Flemish 
government’s recent decision to close its 
parliamentary TA institute and the institution-
al expansion of TA in Wallonia and elsewhere 
in Europe. It argues that TA has politics, as 
TA in Flanders and Wallonia aligns with the 
advent of strategic science and is also affil-
iated to specific political parties. As these 
considerations run counter to the dominant 
representation of TA as a neutral governance 
tool that serves the needs of all STI decision 
makers, they draw into question the viability 
and utility of TA within contemporary KBEs.
1 Introduction
Today, industrialized nations and regions invest 
increasing amounts of public resources in sci-
ence and technology. Flanders and Wallonia are 
no exception to this general trend. Originally uni-
fied with the regions of Brussels under a common 
Belgian government and administration, Flanders 
and Wallonia have developed their own science, 
technology, and innovation policies. While these 
policies serve Flemish and Walloon policymakers 
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and innovation actors (e.g. politicians, captains of 
industry, enterprises) as a lever for regional eco-
nomic development and regional self-assertion 
(Delvenne 2011; Delvenne et al. 2013), they also 
increasingly converge around the global knowl-
edge-based economy narrative. Accordingly, 
both regions presently structure their STI policies 
around the KBE principles of knowledge accumu-
lation and market-driven innovation. In Flanders, 
this represents an effort to become a “leading in-
novation region” (VIA 2006) that can compete 
with the best innovation economies in the world, 
while in Wallonia a vision is projected of the re-
gion becoming “the architect of its own fate” (GW 
2005, p. 3). As stated in the Walloon government’s 
2005 Marshall Plan,1 “economic recovery should 
bear on innovation and industry-university part-
nership within a European Knowledge Society/
Economy” (GW 2005, p. 22).
Taking these local and global market-driven 
imperatives as its entry points, this article renders 
explicit how STI in Flanders and Wallonia is af-
fected and, potentially, transformed by technolo-
gy assessment. Broadly defined, TA encompasses 
activities and programs that extend and deepen 
the knowledge base of contemporary KBEs, often 
beyond purely economic and commercial inter-
ests (van Oudheusden et al. 2014). As we illus-
trate in this article, initial Flemish TA initiatives 
in the 1980s challenged technology-centric, mar-
ket-led innovation policies for failing to consider 
the wider social, ecological, and ethical ramifica-
tions of technology. By deepening and broadening 
traditional, usually linear, views of innovation, 
Flemish TA has evolved with Flanders’ transition 
to a knowledge-driven economy that seeks to be 
competitive as well as sustainable, inclusive, and 
democratic (VIA 2006).
Conversely, in Wallonia, due to the institu-
tional fragmentation of STI competence across 
overlapping communal and regional substate 
entities, the absence of TA is linked to the be-
lated emergence of a socioeconomic context that 
is conducive to knowledge-driven innovation.2 
Over the last fifteen years, however, STI policies 
have dramatically evolved and even become a 
cornerstone of Walloon regional policymaking. 
As we will see, these shifts were accompanied 
by a rise of interest in TA on behalf of Walloon 
governing bodies and policymakers.
To put these considerations in due empiri-
cal and comparative perspective, we retrace the 
emergence and evolution of Flemish and Walloon 
TA in connection with regional innovation policy. 
We draw on accounts provided to us by policy an-
alysts and spokesmen, industry research leaders, 
trade unionists, civil servants, parliamentarians 
and academics very knowledgeable of regional, 
Belgian, and European innovation policy and TA, 
as well as information taken from the secondary 
literature on innovation policy and TA. We stress 
that this study does not fully map the policy de-
bate on STI in Flanders and Wallonia. Rather, 
the emphasis is on TA actors and processes, and 
particularly on TA’s institutional uptake and the 
potential impact on STI policymaking.
Our review brings a macrosociological and 
political sensitivity to bear on TA and STI pro-
cesses. We suggest that TA processes both enact 
as well as counteract dominant STI policies and 
justifications, and typically do so at the inter-
section of sociotechnical spheres, policies, and 
temporalities. How TA communities position 
themselves or are positioned by innovation ac-
tors (e.g. politicians, industrialists, the media) in 
relation to dominant policy paradigms (e.g. re-
sponsible research and innovation and the KBE) 
is particularly relevant for consideration in view 
of the Flemish government’s 2012 decision to 
close its parliamentary TA agency, the Institute 
for Society and Technology. It is also important 
in view of recent attempts to set up a Walloon 
parliamentary TA institute. Whereas the Flem-
ish decision appears largely out of sync with the 
growth and development of TA activity across 
Europe,3 it coincides with the recent transforma-
tion of the iconic Danish Board of Technology 
into a nonprofit trading foundation.
2 Technology Assessment in Belgium
Since the 1970s, constitutional reforms have grad-
ually transformed Belgium from a unified state 
into a federal one with communities, regions, and 
language areas. The reforms were enacted as a 
means of finding constitutional and legal solutions 
for the problems between the country’s Dutch and 
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French speaking communities. As a consequence 
of these reforms, the STI regime (Delvenne 2011; 
Fallon 2011) in Belgium came to be decentralized, 
based on a horizontal division of policy domains 
between the regions of Flanders (in the north), 
Wallonia (in the south), and the Brussels capital 
region (in the center). Each entity now pursues, 
develops, and implements its own STI policies, 
more or less independent from the federal state 
and from one another. For instance, in 2003, Flan-
ders launched its Innovation Pact. In 2005, Wallo-
nia launched its Marshall Plan (since 2009 known 
as Marshall Plan 2. Vert), while Brussels initiated 
a Regional Innovation Plan.
The Roots of Flemish TA
Although Flanders is presently the economical-
ly richer region, it lagged behind Wallonia until 
the middle of the twentieth century. The region 
gradually became more prosperous than Wal-
lonia after the Second World War, following 
the decline of Wallonia’s “old” coal and iron 
industries (Halleux et al. 2009). When the first 
ever Flemish government came to power in the 
1980s, it made attempts to boost Flemish eco-
nomic self-awareness and position Flanders as 
an industrial, entrepreneurial and highly techno-
logical region (Oosterlynck 2006, p. 98). A deter-
mining figure in this transformation was the then 
chair of the Flemish government, Gaston Geens. 
Geens launched “DIRV”, which stands for Derde 
Industriële Revolutie Vlaanderen, literally Third 
Industrial Revolution Flanders.
The program lent support to various “ba-
sic” and “applied” technologies, including the 
highly promising and already emanating fields 
of biotechnology, new materials, and microelec-
tronics. Less perceptibly, but equally important, 
DIRV delivered a decisive break with econom-
ic pessimism in Flanders. It was a conspicuous 
campaign, which served the Flemish government 
as a means to present “a clear image of itself to 
the general public, with an offensive policy of 
its own, distinct from both Walloon policy and 
national policy” (Goorden 2004, p. 8).
Various authors and interviewees hence 
identify DIRV as a “keystone” not just in instigat-
ing contemporary innovation policy in Flanders, 
but also acknowledge its role in contributing to 
a range of political-economic reforms that pri-
marily emphasized entrepreneurship and restrict-
ed Keynesian state intervention in the economy. 
While these restructurings emerged in response 
to various international and domestic trends and 
challenges (e.g. the linguistic conflict in Bel-
gium), they were also the result of ideological 
crafting and the search for new policy paradigms 
(Witte et al. 1997, p. 321). It is, partly at least, 
against this background that ensuing programs, 
actions, and controversies in the Flemish innova-
tion context should be understood, including the 
emergence and development of TA.
As a program of large-scale reform, DIRV 
met with strong opposition from the political left, 
including the socialist trade union ABVV (repre-
senting traditional industries, among others). One 
of its most vocal critics in the Flemish parliament 
is the socialist Norbert De Batselier. These ac-
tors criticized DIRV for its strong emphasis on 
entrepreneurship and small government, and its 
neglect of social dimensions.
In response to these criticisms, Geens con-
ceded to the demands of the trade unions to erect 
the Stichting Technologie Vlaanderen (STV), 
which officially translates into Flemish Founda-
tion for Technology Assessment. As a govern-
ment-financed agency led by the social partners4 
and embedded in the Social Economic Council 
of Flanders (SERV), STV’s aim was to analyze 
the social dimensions of new technologies and 
advise the government on issues of science and 
technology (SERV 1994; SERV 1998; Goorden 
1990). Shortly after STV’s creation, the first TA 
initiatives were launched as academic research 
programs. Following Goorden (2004, p. 11), we 
label these initiatives early-warning TA, as they 
were charged with examining the social impact 
of new technologies such as biotechnology and 
microelectronics.
Two TA Initiatives in Wallonia
The emergence of Flemish TA did not go unno-
ticed in the south of Belgium. In the aftermath of 
DIRV, the then Walloon minister of Research and 
Technology, Melchior Wathelet (Christian Social 
Party, PSC), attempted to position Wallonia in re-
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lation to Flemish innovation policy. While some 
Walloon labor representatives and social partners 
in the Walloon Economic and Social Council 
(CESRW) favored the erection of an institute like 
STV in their region, liberal and Christian-Demo-
cratic parties feared such an institute would rein-
force the power of the social partners. Even so, in 
1988 Melchior Wathelet proposed a study on the 
opportunity and feasibility of erecting a Walloon 
PTA institute. This study was delegated to the 
Research Center in Informatics and Law (CRID) 
at the University of Namur. The CRID team vis-
ited several TA institutions across the globe and 
recommended a TA model quite similar to that of 
the US Office of Technology Assessment, OTA. 
When it came to assessing this study, the CESRW 
pointed out that this proposition did not fit the 
Walloon context and the needs of potential users. 
In addition, it criticized the limited institutional 
approach and its disconnection to European evo-
lution, especially the “participatory turn” in Den-
mark (Joss 1998) and the rise of constructive TA 
in the Netherlands (Schot/Rip 1997).
The second initiative to introduce TA came 
from Gérard Valenduc, then representative of the 
Christian trade union at the CESRW, and member 
of its research commission, the Walloon Council 
for Science Policy (CPS). In 1991, he obtained 
funding for a new exploratory project called Ex-
periences of Mediation and Evaluation of Re-
search and Technological Innovation (EMERIT) 
from the new minister in charge of New Tech-
nologies, Albert Liénard (also a Christian-Dem-
ocrat). The idea behind EMERIT was to catch up 
with recent regional TA developments in other 
European regions (e.g., in Baden-Wurttemberg) 
and to develop TA activities based on concerted 
social measures. These objectives differed mark-
edly from the original idea of supporting parlia-
mentary decision making, centering instead on 
fostering the appropriate conditions for an inno-
vation-friendly socioeconomic climate. Then, in 
1994, following a conference within the EMERIT 
framework, Liénard announced his proposition to 
assign the CPS (nested within the CESRW) a TA 
mission. The CESRW accepted but some of its 
members remained suspicious about TA, an activ-
ity it had not been prepared for. After completing 
four studies, the CPS in 2002 decided to abort its 
TA mission, considering that it had not succeeded 
in attracting the attention of its main addressees, 
the Walloon parliament and government. In fact, 
the CPS never received any demands for formal 
TA from its addressees. Its most successful activ-
ities were those dedicated to the popularization of 
science, which were not tailored to meet their us-
ers’ political needs and failed to move the social 
debate forward (Delvenne 2009).
Bottom-up and Interactive TA in Flanders
Meanwhile, in Flanders another STI policy vi-
sion came to the fore. Flemish policymakers, in-
novators, and entrepreneurs asserted that Flemish 
innovation policy needed a more integrated take 
on innovation that acknowledges the complex in-
terplay between science, technology, and other, 
nontechnical groups of actors, such as social and 
economic sectors. Policymakers therefore called 
for a kind of bottom-up TA, which they described 
as an approach “that may not slow down or have 
a negative influence on creativity and the inno-
vation process”.5 To this end TA activities had 
to be organized in close interaction with R&D 
efforts in governmental technology programs on 
biotechnology, new materials and energy, and 
environmental technology. The expectation was 
that if TA were conducted in direct consultation 
with science and technology producers, research 
would lead to socially useful applications.
Their successive bottom-up experience with 
relegating TA to R&D projects and technological 
programs led scientists and technologists to think 
critically about their research activities. Howev-
er, because the institutional context for R&D did 
not systematically offer any incentives to civil 
society, as well, to reflect on technological de-
velopments, the palette of contributed perspec-
tives shrank to those areas that are considered 
most relevant to scientists and engineers, notably 
safety and health risks, and market opportunities.
In order to create a more interactive type 
of TA in which Flemish civil society, as well as 
citizens, participate through a deliberative pro-
cess, in 2000 TA was assigned to an institution 
advising the Flemish parliament, the Flemish In-
stitute for Science and Technology Assessment 
(viWTA, later renamed the Institute Society and 
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Technology, IST, before the institute’s closure in 
2012; Delvenne et al. 2012). The institute adopt-
ed a twofold mission: to stimulate social debate 
on sociotechnical developments, and to inform 
and advise MPs on the social, ethical, and eco-
nomic implications of scientific-technological 
developments. To these ends, viWTA initiated 
participatory activities within and outside the 
Flemish parliament (e.g., citizen workshops, 
public debates, and technology festivals).
It is important to note that with the erection 
of viWTA, TA was removed from the R&D en-
terprise itself. That is, in contrast to several STV 
programs and early-warning TA initiatives men-
tioned above, TA was not fully ingrained in the 
innovation process. Rather, TA took place in a 
different location and time, namely in a parlia-
mentary setting.
The Rebirth of Parliamentary TA?
Ironically, a few years before the IST’s closure, 
TA again gained momentum in Wallonia.6 A po-
litical scientist at the University of Liège (and co-
author of this article), Pierre Delvenne, initiated 
contact with Walloon policymakers with the aim 
of raising awareness about TA (Delvenne 2009; 
Delvenne et al. 2012). After having initiated a 
series of interactive workshops involving govern-
ment officials, consultative groups, labor unions, 
and others, about the prospects of TA in Wallonia, 
a Walloon MP by the name of Joëlle Kapompolé 
(Socialist Party) publicly announced a proposal 
for a parliamentary decree to found a TA institute 
linked to parliament. Other MPs, as well as the for-
mer minister for New Technologies and Research 
declared they would support the proposal. Subse-
quently, in November 2008, it was stated that a 
special line of funding would be considered. Ac-
cording to the proposal, the TA institute “should 
make use of participatory methods and function 
as an exchange and discussion platform for con-
structive social debate on technological options 
without being an obstacle to technological devel-
opment”. However, several issues remained to be 
clarified. During the 2009 regional elections, the 
Socialist and Ecologist parties included the con-
cept of a TA institute in their programs.7 After the 
elections, when a political majority comprising 
Socialists, Ecologists, and Christian-Democrats 
was installed, the establishment of a TA institution 
became part of the government’s agenda.
In May 2011, the ministers Jean-Claude 
Marcourt (Socialist, in charge of new technolo-
gies) and Jean-Marc Nollet (Ecologist, in charge 
of research and science policy) referred to Ka-
pompolé’s initiative to announce a joint initiative 
for a full-fledged Walloon Institute of Technol-
ogy Assessment. They emphasized its role for 
policymaking as well as its potential contribu-
tion to stimulating societal debate on science and 
technology. They also underlined that the new 
institute should function as a completely inde-
pendent office within parliament and would rely 
on a network of experts. Government and par-
liament were identified as the main users of the 
TA structure, and to a certain extent it was even 
suggested that organized citizen groups would 
be able to ask the TA office to commission TA 
studies. Furthermore, the joint initiative empha-
sized the importance for the future structure to 
mobilize participatory methods, a procedure that 
is relatively uncommon in Wallonia.
However, political tensions between the two 
ministers in charge led to a blockade of the project 
for almost two years. These tensions were related 
to divergent political visions regarding the future 
of Wallonia rather than to opposing perspectives 
on TA. The main issue concerned the addressees 
of the TA institute: As a convinced regionalist, 
Marcourt wanted the TA institute to work exclu-
sively for the Walloon region (and thus for the 
Walloon region’s parliament and government). 
Nollet, on the other hand, demanded that the in-
stitute address the parliament and government 
of the French Community as well. Whereas the 
regionalist argument underlined the territorial 
differences between Brussels and Wallonia, the 
integrationist vision highlighted regional incor-
poration. Accordingly, Nollet planned to estab-
lish a new science policy across the whole of 
Wallonia-Brussels and had similar plans for TA. 
It took both ministers’ cabinets about two years 
to reconcile their seemingly incompatible views.
Despite this blockade, throughout 2013 sev-
eral MPs from the major political fractions con-
sulted the SPIRAL Research Centre at the Uni-
versity of Liège to help initiate the establishment 
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of a parliamentary working group on TA in the 
Walloon parliament. The SPIRAL unit (support-
ed by the PACITA project) responded by setting 
up a series of “Technology Assessment work-
ing lunches”8 aimed at raising awareness of TA 
among MPs and their collaborators (van Oud-
heusden 2013). These sessions were dedicated 
to a TA simulation exercise on a topic of interest 
to MPs (e.g., aging populations, cloud comput-
ing, sustainable consumption) in order to jointly 
explore how TA can inform and support parlia-
mentary work on STI. As the TA working lunch-
es were generally well received, the parliament’s 
president Patrick Dupriez (Ecologist) joined 
Joëlle Kapompolé and her colleagues from the 
parliamentary working group to write another de-
cree proposal to establish a TA institution serving 
parliament and government, again with the sup-
port of the University of Liège. At the end of the 
legislature, a full-grown decree was approved in 
the plenary session and put on the agenda of the 
committees in charge of research, economy, and 
new technologies. However, at the end of the leg-
islature in spring 2014, parliament was dissolved 
before the concerned committees could pass the 
decree. As a consequence, the decree presently 
remains in limbo in the legislative process.
3 Discussion
The historical overview above allows us to pin-
point and compare defining characteristics of 
Flemish and Walloon TA, partly in light of recent 
TA developments across Europe.9
To begin with, it is striking that both Flem-
ish and Walloon TA emerged and matured in a 
strategic, knowledge-centered STI environment, 
i.e., an environment that forges new alliances be-
tween the scientific establishment, policymakers, 
and societal actors for the sake of science-driven 
economic development. In fact, Walloon TA did 
not mature until such a strategic science regime 
was firmly in place, bringing to the fore systemic 
approaches to innovation and university-indus-
try partnerships (Fallon/Delvenne 2009). Thus, 
the institutionalization of TA may well depend 
upon the emergence of strategic science as a new 
mode of knowledge production (Delvenne 2011). 
Following Rip (2000), strategic science heralds 
a shift in scientific knowledge production from 
relatively isolated, “basic”, academic research, to 
research that is economically and socially relevant 
and that can only be understood within a context 
of its use. TA potentially transforms this context 
by bringing more diverse epistemic cultures and 
“knowledges” into STI processes. Knowledge 
here no longer only refers to intellectual property, 
technological applications, and scientific theories, 
but also, and increasingly, to new kinds of exper-
tise (e.g., sociological, lay, indigenous), to new 
forms and manifestations of relevance (e.g., social 
and ecological concerns), and the democratization 
of sociotechnical culture at large (Knorr-Cetina 
1999, p. 8; Bijker 1995). TA can thus contribute to 
broadening, deepening, and governing knowledge 
in contemporary KBEs, which is precisely what 
STI policymakers and various innovation enactors 
claim innovation is, or should be, about.10
The emergence of the EU-wide Science 
in Society projects like Parliaments and Civ-
il Society in Technology Assessment (PACITA 
2011–2015) lends weight to the above hypothe-
sis.11 While it is too early to determine the policy 
impact of PACITA, it is important to note that 
PACITA is designed to facilitate “coordination 
and networking activities, dissemination and 
use of knowledge” in support of research activ-
ities and policies. In fact, PACITA is construed 
as a “Mobilisation and Mutual Learning Action 
Plan [that] will distribute capacity and enhance 
the institutional foundation for knowledge-based 
policy-making on issues involving science, tech-
nology and innovation (…)”.12 The potential in-
fluence of PACITA is felt in Wallonia, which in 
contrast to Flanders has never institutionalized 
TA, but which now explicitly gears its STI poli-
cy towards the KBE and strategic science (Plan 
Marshall 2. Vert; Plan Marshall 2022).
It would thus appear that TA not only relies 
on, but thrives in, the context of knowledge-driv-
en innovation. However, if TA is to exert a last-
ing influence in the KBE, TA actors must clearly 
present TA’s credentials as a decisive knowledge 
player to policymakers and innovation actors. 
We return to this point shortly.
Second, Flemish and Walloon TA tap into a 
political culture that emphasizes the importance 
of concerted social action. In Belgium, collective 
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bargaining between trade unions, employers’ 
organizations, and governments is an import-
ant political and social tradition that allows TA 
practices to gain a firm foothold in multilayered, 
consociational democracies (Lijphart 1977). The 
erection of the Flemish TA institute STV in re-
sponse to the DIRV campaign and the lodging 
of a Walloon TA mission in the Economic and 
Social Council (CESRW) in the 1990s illustrate 
this point, as trade unions demanded their say 
in STI policymaking.13 Seen in this way, TA can 
arbitrate between scientific, political, and social 
worlds. When TA is integrated into R&D settings 
(e.g., Flemish technology action programs) and/
or embedded into parliaments or other formal 
policymaking bodies, it can open new negotia-
tion practices and establish a more integrative 
and inclusive decision-making culture.
However, the institutionalization of TA also 
entails risks. As noted earlier, when the IST (for-
merly viWTA) was installed in the Flemish par-
liament in 2000, TA was physically removed from 
the R&D process. Thus, while TA gained a foot-
hold within formal Flemish policy circles, it be-
came less ingrained in scientific and technological 
research activities across the region. In addition, 
as Horst (2014) argues in relation to the restruc-
turing of the DBT by the Danish government in 
2011, when TA is embedded within formal poli-
cy-making bodies and processes, it risks being do-
mesticated or “tamed”. This is because established 
organizations may find it hard to change, adapt, 
and reposition themselves to meet new needs in 
complex and changing environments (Gubrium/
Holstein 2001). As Horst notes, in Denmark dem-
ocratic debate about science and technology lost 
momentum after the DBT’s institutionalization in 
1986. In the years that followed, Danes came to 
take debate of this kind for granted. In fact, many 
Danes appeared ignorant of the DBT’s existence 
in spite of its high international visibility.
Whether or not similar assertions can be 
made about the closing of the Flemish IST is an 
open question, which we do not delve into in this 
article. Rather, we want to draw attention to the 
political affiliations of Flemish and Walloon TA. 
As illustrated by the erection of STV in 1984, 
Flemish TA emanated on the left side of the po-
litical spectrum, specifically among the green and 
socialist parties. The same political families initi-
ated parliamentary TA, which led to the erection of 
viWTA (IST) in 2000. Arguably, in Wallonia the 
politics of TA are not so outspoken or visible. Yet, 
it should be noted that the Socialist and Ecologist 
factions took the initiative to institutionalize TA 
and that TA is typically associated with a political 
preference for more participatory or deliberative 
modes of decision making. These preferences are 
not neutral. They have been reproduced in a great 
number of other European countries where left-
wing political parties play, or played, a key role in 
institutionalizing TA (Delvenne 2011). As noted 
elsewhere (van Oudheusden 2014), TA’s polit-
ical affiliations are often denied or downplayed 
across TA communities. TA is typically framed as 
an analytic activity aimed at providing decision 
makers with an objective analysis of a technolo-
gy (van Eijndhoven 1997) and/or as an interactive 
and communicative tool that aims to enrich the 
basis for public debate and STI decision making 
(Decker/Ladikas 2004). These broad designations 
(i.e., geared towards all political factions and to 
the benefit of all innovation actors) risk trivializ-
ing and undermining the very policy changes TA 
advocates seek to instigate when TA is associated 
with specific political parties or politicians.
The above considerations deserve to be 
taken into account, as they shed light on how 
and why TA is institutionalized (or conversely, 
de-institutionalized), and how TA is enveloped in 
broader STI processes, such as the EU-wide shift 
towards responsible innovation (von Schomberg 
2011). They are also helpful when reflecting on 
the evolving viability and utility of TA within 
contemporary KBEs, as TA and STI processes 
have coevolved as “dancing partners,” relative-
ly independent from one another and yet in con-
tinuous interaction (Rip 1992). The Flemish and 
Walloon TA experiences described in this article 
can thus serve TA communities, STI policymak-
ers, and innovation scholars as entry points to 
ponder the role, place, and orientation of region-
al, national, and European TA in the years ahead.
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Notes
1) Marshall Plan is the name given to a broad so-
cioeconomic policy program that intends to re-
vitalize the Walloon economy along the lines of 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity.
2) In a case study approach to “expanding the TA 
landscape in Wallonia”, Delvenne et al. (2013, pp. 
283–284) provide a more detailed account of the 
institutional fragmentation of STI competence in 
Belgium. They point to differences between Flan-
ders and Wallonia that hindered the emergence of 
KBE rationales in Wallonia.
3) Notably through the EU-wide Framework 7 project 
Parliaments and Civil Society in Technology As-
sessment (PACITA), on which more follows below.
4) The term “social partners” is often used in Belgian 
policy discourse and encompasses employers’ or-
ganizations and trade unions. These actors are reg-
ularly engaged in formalized and structured soci-
oprofessional negotiations following the political 
model of consociationalism (Lijphart 1977).
5) Technology Note of the Flemish government 
(1994).
6) It is worth noting that the closure of IST hardly 
drew policy attention in Wallonia, whereas TA, as 
a topic of interest, did. This says much about the 
effects of regionalization of Flemish and Walloon 
STI policy and the public scope of debates on sci-
ence in society in Belgium.
7) In Wallonia and Brussels, the green, or environ-
mentalist, political party is called Ecolo, which is 
short for the French word écologiste.
8) Prior to these TA working lunches, an internation-
al conference was held in the Walloon parliament 
(March 8, 2013), which gathered former and actual 
directors or senior staffers from TA institutions in 
the United States and Europe. See van Oudheusden 
(2013) and the event’s website, http://tapw.word-
press.com/, last accessed on September 3, 2014.
9) These reflections build on and are further devel-
oped in van Oudheusden et al. 2014.
10) Consider the many EU policy discourses on in-
tegrating science in society for the sake of good 
innovation governance. For instance, in a 2013 Ex-
pert Group Report to the EU’s Directorate General 
for Research and Innovation, we read that “The 
[Responsible Research and Innovation] approach 
has to be a key part of the research and innovation 
process and should be established as a collective, 
inclusive and system-wide approach” (http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/research/science-society/document_li-
brary/pdf_06/options-forstrengthening_en.pdf).
11) See http://www.pacitaproject.eu.
12) See the EU CORDIS website: http://cordis.euro-
pa.eu/project/rcn/98487_en.html
13) The aforementioned EMERIT project sustained 
the idea of enlarging the social dialogue to encom-
pass science and technology issues, with the par-
ticipation of civil society, while acknowledging the 
formalized and structured social dialogue typical 
of the Belgian model of concerted social action.
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